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the right to prevent persons claiming under the owners of the minE
from polluting the water (in the ordinary course of their mining
business). Consistently with the principles which govern this subject, the owner of the mine might have gained by long use the
right to discharge its water upon the land of his neighbor, subject
to the right concurrently acquired by him to require the watercourse to be maintained. Viewed in this light, an adverse possession was only necessary on the part of the owner of the dominant
tenement. In substance and effect, the right gained by the owner
of the servient tenement was but a qualification of the principal
right, and not such in its nature as to require an adverse possession.
On the whole, the true doctrine respecting the acquisition of
reciprocal servitude by long-continued enjoyment appears to be
that when the principal servitude has a perpetual cause, and the
benefits and disadvantages have been simultaneously experienced
by the owner of each tenement, an agreement may be presumed
as a matter of fact by the triers, according to the circumstances
of the case, that there has been a grant from the owner of each
tenement to the other, giving a right to enjoy the privileges exercised as reciprocal and material charges upon the respective tenements.
S. F. D.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
in the matter of the constitutionality of
the Act of the General Assembly, approved December 24th
1862, entitled ,An.Act in addition to an Act entitled an Act
relating to electors and elections," providing a mode of taking
the votes in the election of state and other officers, of persons
absent from the state as volunteers in the military service of the
United States.

OPINION OF THE JUDGES

The constitution of this State providds for the tin

of holding the annual election
on the first Monday in May, in each year. And it also provides the place, viz.,
in an "electors' meeting" composed of the electors in the several towns, duly
"warned, convened, organizedand held for thatpurpose.
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These provisions of the constitution, together with numerous other incidental and
accessary provisions in the same instrument, clearly indicating an unquestionable purpose, in those who framed as well as in those who adopted that instrument,
to require the electors to vote only within the several towns where they have
their residence, and at the time and place, within such towns, of holding the
regular annual meetings of electors for that purpose, leave no room for constructitn, and afford no room to doubt, that any act of the legislature authorizing the votes of electors to be taken at any other place, or in any other manner,
does conflict with the explicit and unequivocal provisions of the constitution,
and is therefbre void.

BUTLER, J.-Having been convened by the governor, pursuant
to the direction of the General Assembly, to adv'ise him respecting
the constitutionality of the act in question, we have given it that
careful consideration which a proper deference and respect for the
legislature and the obvious equity of the law on the one hand, and
the importance of adhering, inflexibly, to the fundamental and essential principles of constitutional law on the other, required of*us.
On such consideration we have unanimously certified to the governor our opinion, that, in respect to the election of governor,
lieutenant-governor, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and members
of the General Assembly, the act is unconstitutional. It remains,
in accordance with the settled policy of the state and the presumed
expectation of the Assembly, that we furnish to the reporter of the
decisions of this Court our reasons for that opinion.,
The constitution of the state, framed by a convention elected
for that purpose and adopted by the people, embodies their supreme
originalwill, in respect to the organization and perpetuation of a
state government; the division and distribution of its powers ; the
officers by whom those powers are-to be exercised; and the limitatior necessary to restrain the action of each and all for the preservation of the rights, liberties, and privileges of all ; and is therefore
the supreme and paramount law, to which the legislative, as well
as every other branch of the government, and every officer in the
performance of his duties, must conform. Whatever that supreme
original will prescribes, the General Assembly, and every officer or
citizen to whom the mandate is addressed, must do; and whatever
it prohibits, the General Assembly, and every officer and citizen,
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must refrain from doing; and if either attempt to do that which is
prescribed, in any other manner than that prescribed, or to do in
any manner that which is prohibited, their action is repugnant to
that supreme and paramount law, and invalid.
The constitution establishes an elective government, and under
it there must of necessity be a fixed time,, place, and manner of
holding elections. If these are clearly and sufficiently fixed and
prescribed by the constitution, and nothing is expressly delegated
or by implication left to the legislature, that body cannot interfere to alter, extend, or suspend them, or either of them, in the
slightest particular. If they are not thus fixed and prescribed by
the constitution, it is by implication incident to the general legislative power to do it, so that the government may be perpetuated
and sustained. Pratt vs. Allen, 13 Conn. 119.
Our simple inquiry therefore is, whether the constitution has so
fully and clearly prescribed the time, place, and manner of holding
elections, or either of them, as to leave, by implication, no power
in the General Assembly to prescribe them, or either of them, in the
way and to the extent they have attempted to do in the act in
question.
In relation to the time, place, and manner of holding elections,
the constitutions of the several states differ. In some of them all
three are prescribed with that particularity which forbids all action by the legislature. In others neither are prescribed, but the
qualification required of the voters is fixed, and the power to regulate the time, place, and manner committed to the legislature ; and
in such states, the reception of votes out of the state may be constitutionally authorized. In others, one or more of them is prescribed, and the rest left for legislative provision. Thus in Pennsylvania, the place only was prescribed by the constitution; but
that was sufficient to render an act of the legislature authorizing
the reception of soldiers' votes out of the state invalid. It was
provided in the constitution of*that state that the legislature should
divide the state into, " election districts," and that no person should
be entitled to vote in any district who had not resided, during the
ten days next preceding the time when he should offer to vote, in

RELATING TO ELECTORS AND ELECTIONS.

the district where the vote should be offered. Their supreme court
held that under such a provision "election districts " must be territorial subdivisions of the state, and could not be formed or extended
out of it; that an "offer to vote" must be personally made, in the
"election district" where the voter had a right to make the offer;
and that therefore the legislature could not authorize a vote to be
offered or received in any place out of the state.
It was the intention of the men who framed the constitution of
this state, and of the people who adopted it, to place everything
pertaining to the election ok state officers and members of the General Assembly beyond the reach of subsequent legislatures. The'
political contest which preceded it was one of the most bitter ever
known. Mr. Hollister, in his History of Connecticut, vol. 2, page
512, says of it: "To recite the details of the party strifes of that
iay, would be to dig up from the graves that ought for ever to hide
them, some of the most bitter and malignant pamphlets and newspaper articles that ever disgraced the politics of the Northern States.
The whole ground seemed to be covered with pamphleteers, libellers,
scurrilous facts, and all other driftwood that the swollen currents
of popular prejudice and bad passions can dislodge from the ooze
where they lie half hidden or remote from view in quiet times."
Among the causes of complaint he further says: "Those bearing
on the elective franchise were looked upon as especially tyrannical.
The Istand up law,' as it was denominated, which required voters
to stand up at elections, and expose themselves and their political
sentiments to the scrutiny of the public, was complained of as subjecting the voter to the cruel ordeal of being gazed at by his creditors."
It was from such a state of things that the constitution emerged;
and we cannot shut our eyes to the fact which history, and the
provisions and repetitions of the instrument teach us, that it was
one of the leading objects of the convention and- the people, to direct explicitly and exclusively, and in every essential detail, when,
where, and how the elective franchise should be exercised.
1. Thus, in the first place, they directed that the time of holding
the annual election should be the first Monday of April in each
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year. During the high and close party times, from 1830 to 1836,
it not unfrequently happened that parties in a particular town were
so balanced or divided, that the electors balloted all day, and
until twelve o'clock at night, without electing representatives ; and
as the constitution prescribed that they should be elected before
the other officers could be voted for, the representation and the
votes for state officers in such towns were lost. No one supposed
the General Assembly could remedy the evil, and in 1886 an amendment was adopted authorizing the legislature to provide by law for
an adjournment of the electors' meeting in such towns, and in.such
case, to a subsequent day. And so the constitution now stands as
to time, and in that respect no change was attempted by the law
in question.
2. The constitution is equally explicit in its direction as to place,
and that place is in an "electors' meeting," composed of the electors in the respective towns qualified to vote in the town, duly
warned, convened, organized, and held, for that purpose.
The constitution is not so much a creative, as a defining and
restraining instrument. Under the charter of Charles I., which
was the fundamental law from the time it was procured till 1818,
the government was a corporation, of which every "freeman" was
a member, and the General Court or Assembly had power "to erect
and make judicatories," "to make and ordain all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws," &c., "to name and style all sorts of
officers, and distinguish and set forth their several duties," &c.,
"to dispose and order the election of annual officers," and "for
the directing, ruling, and disposing of all other matters and things."
The General Court or Assembly had, therefore, supreme legislative
and judicial power, and substantially supreme control of the executive power; and nearly everything was subject to the will or caprice of a legislative majority. The introduction of other religious
sects and denominations, and of national party questions and interests after the organization 'of the national government, both variant from the feelings and opinions of the majority, producing
the state of things described by Mr. Hollister, led the people,
gradually, to see the necessity for a bill of rights to restrain the
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power of the General Assembly; a separation of the judicial from
the legislative power;- and such ordering of the time, place, and
manner of conducting elections as would place them for ever beyond
the control of the General Assembly; and to effect these and other
purposes, and among them to provide for full religious liberty, was
their purpose in establishing the constitution. It was not their desire or intention to effect a general or 'extensive alteration of theil
political system, but to effect a separation and distribution of the
powers of government, and impose necessary restraints upon the
General Assembly and the action of a legislative majority. Hence
they say in the preamble, that their purpose was "more effectually
to define, secure, and perpetuate the liberties, rights, and privileges
which they derived from their ancestors."
The constitution does not in any of its provisions speak "of an
election, or the election, but, everywhere and invariably, of the
"meetings of the electors" for the purpose of electing the respective
officers.
The convention found the "freemen's -meeting" a distinct and
peculiar feature in the political system of the state, as old as its
history. It originated in 1689, in the compact or cohstitution formed
by the towns of Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield, in a provision for the warning of a "freemen's meeting" to elect deputies
(representatives) from each town to the General Court (Assembly).
From that year, and after the merger of the INew Haven colony
-under the charter of Charles, there has never been an electionf by
thepeople, of representatives or-state officers, in any other manner
or place., The convention adopted' this feature, as they did -in the
main the other institutions of th6 state, changing its nam'e to " electors' meeting."- And then, in pursuance of one of their lbading
purposes, they directed, in as clear-and explicit language'as they
could command, and specifically, and with repetitiorfas-to each of
the officers, that they should be sucdessively voted 'for and chosen
"at," or "in," that elector's meeting. There the constitution -directs that the votes of the electors shall be offered and received;
that is the only place contemplated or in any way alluded to in
that instrument where they may be offered and received; and there
VOL. XI.-80
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only, we are satisfied, they must be offered and received, or they
can have no cbnstitutional operation in the election for which they
are cast. A few extracts will demonstrate this.
In the first place, we find in Art. 6, Sec. 9, the following general provision:
"Thp meetings of the electors for the .election of the several
state officers, by law annually to be elected, and members of the
General Assembly of this state, shall be holden on the first Monday,
of April in each year."
Next we have a general provision (Art. 6, Sec. 6), authorizing
the legislature to make laws "prescribing the manner of regulating
and conducting (not the election, or the voting, but) the meetings
of the electors, and prohibiting, under adequate penalties, all undue
influence therein."
Then we find several provisions and amendments, specific as to
each of the officers, to carry out the same purpose. Thus, in Art. 3,
Sec. 5, it is provided'that, "at the meetings of the electors, held
in the several towns in this state, in April annually, after the
election of representatives, the electors present shall be called upon
to bring in their written ballots for senators," &c. ; and the same
language is used in the amendment of 1828.
Again: "At the meetings of the electors in the respective towns,
&c., after the election of senators, the presiding officers shall call
upon the electors, &c., to bring in their ballots, &c., for governor,"
&c. Art. 4, Sec. 2.
"At the annual meetings of the electors, &c., there shall be
chosen, &c., a lieutenant-governor," &c. Art. 4, Sec. 3.
"A treasurer shall be annually chosen by the electors,-at their
meeting in April," &c. Art. 4, Sec. 17.
"A secretary shall be chosen next after the treasurer, and in
the same manner." Art. 4, Sec. 18.
"A comptroller of public accounts shall be annually chosen by
the electors, in their meeting in April," &e. Amendment of.
1836.
1
"Each elector present at such, meeting, &c., may thereupon
bring in his ballot," &c. Amendment of 1828.
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" The presiding officers shall receive the votes of the electors,
and count and declare them in open meeting," &c. Art. 3, See. 5.
Other citations might 'be added, but these are sufficient. The
intention of the convention and people that every vote cast for
members of the General Assembly, governor, lieutenant, treasurer,
secretary,, and comptroller, should be brought in by the elector in
person, in an organized electors' meeting, in the presence of the
electors, and be there reece'ved by a presiding officer, is so frequently
and explicitly expressed that we cannot entertain a doubt respecting it.
But the act in question authorizes the electors who may be absent in the army to offer their votes on the day of election to the
three senior officers of the regiment or detachment, &c., outside of
any electors' meeting in a town of this state; in an ambulatory
camp, wherever the corps may be on that day, or however engaged; and whether those officers are electors or "not, or citizens
or not ; and the votes to be counted, and lists made and certified
by the commander of the corps, whether an elector or fiot; or'.a
citizen or not; regardless of the right of every elector of the town
to be present to witness the voting and challenge the votes;
and regardless of the constitutional requirement that the votes
shall be counted and declared in the presence of the electors, that
they may judge of the fairness and purity of the election; -and
without any provision for lodging a list with the town clerk for
their subsequent examination. This we think' is a clear 'departure
as to the place of receiving the votes, and as to all the constitutional safeguards incident to the place; and in derogation of the
constitutpna] right of every elector to observe, and challenge if he
see cause, any vote which may 'be cast in the electors' meeting of
the town ; and to see that the votes are correctly counted, and hear
them declared, that he may know, by his tally list or otherwise.
that an honest election has been had. The act is not an exercise
of any power claimed to be expressly delegated, dr an implied
power to supply needed and omitted details .in aid of a general
provision of the constitution, and in harmony with it; but it authorizes an election to be holden at another and different place than
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that which the people, by their supreme will, have specifically and
fully prescribed; by milita2y instead of civil officers; and in derogation of'the constitutional safeguards incident to the- place prescribed in the paramount law. It is therefore manifestly repugnant
to a plain and imperative provision of the constitution, unauthorized and nugatory.
The General Assembly have heretofore ventured to divide some of
the towns into voting districts, under the amendment of 1836;
but they have been very cautious to provide for a principal "electors' meeting" at the usual place where such meetings had been
holden, and the organization of branch "electors' meetings" in
each voting district, and a return of all the votes to the presiding
officer of the principal meeting, to be by him declared in presence
of the electors, and to be certified by him to the secretary of state
and the town clerk. And such caution was necessary to the constitutionality of the law. But no one, we presume, has heretofore
supposed, that a man w ho was detained by sickness at his home, or
the many who are every year detained by business in other states,
or in Congress, or the departments at Washington, or in coasting
vessels, or in the navy yards or navy, or otherwise absent from
home, could, by a mere provision of law, be favored with a special
opportunity to vote. It is said, and truly, that this is an extraordinary exigency; but the men who made the constitution had just
passed through a war which drew many men from the state, and the
exigency of a future war may well have been contemplated as possible ; and the mere magnitude of the exigency and of its consequent equities do not alter its character. But however that may
be, the people saw fit, in their determined intention that 'all elections should be regulated by constitutional provisions, unalterable
by the General Assembly, to prescribe in the clearest manner when,
where, and how the elective franchise should be exercised, and
these provisions must control the General Assembly in all exigeneiee, until changed by the supreme will of the people, expressed in
a new, or amended constitution.
It is not only obvious from this submission for our opinion, but
apparent upon the face of the law, that the General Assembly had
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serious doubts in relation to their power to disregardthe plain and
reiterated mandates of the constitution, in respect to the place
where votes should be offered and received. This is particularly
evident from a provision in the 8th section, that the votes cast by the
soldiers in camp should "be considered, taken, and held to have
been given by them in the respective towns of which they are residents." But that provision, if valid, would not effect the purpose
intended. It is not enough that the votes be, in fact or constructively, cast in the town where the voters reside; they must also be
cast in an electors' meeting in such town, and votes received under
the law on the day of election, by-a military commandant,-.if then
encamped in the town where the voters resided, could not be conctitutionally operative in that election.
Doubtless, the General Assembly may say, in: any language they
choose, that a statute shall be "considered, held, and taken" to
embrace some subject-matter or thing, or construed to, be in accordance with, or a compliance with, some other statute, &c. ; and,
if the place of voting could have been fixed by statute, the provision in question would be valid. But, applied to the constitution,
that provision of the law is an anomaly, and, in effect, an effort by
an inferior to change, extend, and indirectly control .a: clear, full,
exhaustive mandate of its superior in a material particular, even in
respect to its own organization, and inconsistent with the fundamentsil principles of constitutional law.
If the General Assembly can thus add to, alter, and control one
constitutional provision respecting elections, there are no others
beyond their reach. They may direct votes to be tWken at any
time, and say that -they shall be considered, held, and taken to
have been cast on the first Monday of April. They may authorizeminors to vote, and say that their votes shall he considered, taken,
and held to be the votes of electors of full age; or colored men,
and say that their votes shall be considered, taken, and held to be
the votes of white men and electors; and so may authorize the
taking and counting of the votes of women and aliens. Nor
would there remain any other matter of constitutional provision
or purpose, which might not be reached at any time by a temporary and fluctuating legislative majority, and by the same legisla-
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tive alchemy of changing things, constructively, into what they are
not in fact, be practically controlled or annulled. Indeed, the
same process which could turn votes taken in a camp to votes
taken in an electors' meeting, might turn those taken in fact in the
electors' meeting into the votes of women, or aliens, or minors, or
colored men, and exclude them for that reason from the canvass;
and so on, till the constitution and constitutional law became a
mockery.
Nor can it with truth or safety be said, that although the constitution prescribes a certain place where votes may be cast, it does
not prohibit their being cast in any other place. Neither in constitutions, nor statutes, nor contracts, nor wills, nor in any oral directions of a superior to an inferior-as a master to a servant, or
a parent to a child-do men deem it necessary to accompany an
express and full direction to do a particular thing in a particular
way, by an express direction not to do it in any other. Officers,
civil and military, citizens, servants, and children, all understand
that every such direction of a superior carries with it an implied
prohibition against doing the thing prescribed in any other way.
3. And the mandates of the constitution are equally explicit as
to the manner of proceeding. That respecting the choice of governor is in the following words :
"At the meetings of the electors in the respective towns, in the
month of April in each year, immediately after the election of senators, the presiding officers shall call upon the electors to bring in
their ballots for him whom they would elect to be governor, with
his name fairly written. When such ballots shall have been received and counted in the presence of the electors, duplicdte lists
of the persons voted for and of the number of votes given for each,
shall be made and certified by the presiding officer ; one of which
lists shall be deposited in the office of the town clerk, within three
days, and the other transmitted to the secretary or to the sheriff
of the county in which such election shall have been held. The
sheriff receiving such votes shall deliver, or cause them to be delivered, to the secretary, within fifteen days next after said election.
The votes so returned shall be counted by the treasurer, secretary,
and comptroller within the month of April. A fair list of the
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persons and number of votes given for each, together with the returns of the presidingofficers, shall be, by the treasurer, secretary,
and comptruller, made and laid before the General Assembly, then
next to be holden, on the first day of the session thereof; and said
Assembly shall, after an examination of the same, declare the person
whomthey shall find to be legally chosen, and give him notice accordingly." And this provision is expressly made applicable to
the other state officers to be chosen by the electors under the original provisions of the constitution.
To remedy an inconvenience arising from the use of written
ballots only, the necessity of voting for the officers successively,
and from a desire to have a registry law, an amendmient was adopted
in 1836, which was as follows:
" The electors in the respective towns on the first Monday of
April in each year, may vote for governor, lieutenant-governor,
treasurer, secretary, comptroller, senators, and representatives in
the General Assembly, successively, or for any number of said officers
at the same time. And thd General Assembly shall have power to
enact laws regulating and prescribing the order and manner of voting for said officers ;" providing, however, that the votes should
be by ballot, written or printed. This amendment is carefully confined to the order and manner of voting, and confers no power to
change the mandate in any respect, except as to the order and
manner in which the, votes may be given and received. .,
In this mandate, thus amended, all the essential details of time,
place, and manner of proceeding, are fixed, viz:
1. The time, the first Monday in April.
2. The place, the meetings of the electors.
8. The voting to be at the call of the presiding officers, in the
presence of the electots, and in such order and -manneras the General Assembly should direct.
4. The votes to be received, counted, and declaredin the presence
of the electors.
5. Lists, of the votes so given, received, counted, and declared, to
be made and certified by the presiding officers of the electors,
meeting.
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6. One of those lists to be returned to the secretary of the state,
the other to the town clerk.
7. The lists so certified and returned to the secretary to be canvassed by the treasurer, secretary, and comptroller, and aggregate
lists made therefrom.
8. And the lists so returned, with those made by the canvasseys,
to be presented to the General Assembly on the first day of its
session.
9. The general assembly to examine the lists of the presiding
officers and the canvassers, and declare the choice evidenced by
them, and notify the several persons elected.
We are not able to see how the mandate could be more explicit,
complete, or constitutionally exclusive, as to the manner of proceeding.
But the act in question authorized other lists, of other votes,
taken by other, and military, and perhaps alien officers, at other
places, to be certified. by still another officer, and directs the canvassers to count and include such other lists, so that the next General Assembly might declare such persons as should be elected by
all the lists, to be elected. We are entirely satisfied that the act,
in this respect also, is repugnant to the constitution, and invalid,
and that such other lists could not be constitutionally regarded by
the General Assembly in determining the result of the election.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
We have received the foregoing very
perspicuous and able opinion from the
Reporter, Mr. Hooker, and publish it
now, at the expense of an inconvenient
amount of our space. This we have
done as well on account of the importance and interesting character of the
question involved, as of the plain and
straightforward manner in which it is
discussed and disposed of. As this is
not in any sense a partisan or political
question, inasmuch as it affects all persons and parties alike, we may be allowed, we hope, to express our admira-

tion of the manner in which Mr. Justice
BUTLER disposes of the evasions and sub-

terfuges under which, it would seem, the
legislature sought to shield 'itself, by
providing that one thing, which was to
every sensible and sound appreciation
of the subject a most palpable and flagrant violation of the letter and spirit.
of the constitution, should nevertheless
be "considered, held, and taken" to he
some other thing, which it was not, in
order to bring it into harmony with the
constitution.
If there is any one thing more de.
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maging in its effects upon men or bodies
bf men than all others, it is evasion and
subterfuge in order to escape deserved
and inevitable responsibility. It shows,
at the same time, conscious guilt, weakis indeed one
ness, and cowardice. Itof the not uncommon shifts to which
-opular assemblies, in times of popular
excitement, are driven by their weakness
and want of courage. For a considerably numerous body of men will be more
willing to do or to say an untruth than
a single man or a small number of men,
inasmuch as the guilt and discredit are
so much divided that no one in fact
feels much responsibility. Hence, in
the administration of justice, the number four in the members of the court
has been considered as combining more
advantages, and as escaping more objections, than any other number, provided
the work could be accomplished by that
number.
We need not, therefore, be surprised
that the statute in question was passed
with a full conviction and virtual admission upon its face that it did, unless its
provisions could be construed to mean
something else besides what their words
expressed, conflict in express terms with
the provisions of the constitution. We
have known manylegislative acts passed
when it was openly avowed by the members who voted for them that they were
unconstitutional, "but then," said they,
"let the courts take the responsibility!"
And we are glad to find that the courts
have not yet manifested any disposition
to shrink from this responsibility. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Chase vs. Miller, 11 Am. L. Reg. 146,
made a similar decision to the one just
preceding this note. The words of Mr.
Justice WOODWARD, in that case, are
very pertinent to this general question
of bending laws and constitutions to suit
the emergencies and exigencies of the

times. "A good deal has been said
about the hardship of depriving so meritorious a class of voters us our volunteer
soldiers of the right of voting. As a
court of justice we cannot feel the force
of any such consideration. Our business is to expound the constitution and
laws of the country as we find them
written. We have no bounties to grant
to soldiers, or anybody else." "While
such men fight for the constitution, they
do not expect judges'to sap and mine it
by judicial construction."
He must have V'een a careless student
of the history of the advance and the
decline of free states, who has not
yet learned that they depend more for
their permanercy and perpetuity upon
their courts than upon their armies;
moreupon the enforcement of the law and
its purity of administration, than upon
all other interests and estates combined.
It is, in our humble judgment, more attributable to the unflinching firmness
and purity of judicial administration in
the English courts; to that strict and
undeviating adherence, in those tribunals, to the letter and the spirit of the
written and unwritten law of thi land,
than to all other influences combined,
that the British constitution and the
English nation has outlived its feudalism, its despotism, and its barbarism of
a thousand years, and now promises a
thousand years more of constitutional
freedom.
It will be an evil day for our nati3n
when the bench and the bar come to
think lightly of the trusts committed to
their charge, oi to shape their conduct
more by the popular demands than by a
careful adherence to the letter and spirit
of the law. It is not uncommon to hear
pretentious and inexperienced men complain of too rigid adherence in Ahe
courts to the letter of the law or the
constitution. They quote, with great
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apparent triumph, "The letter killeth," quent occasion to observe the far more
&c., without seeming to comprehend strict adherence to rules in the English
that the spirit without the letter is as courts than here, and to note, in consetruly dead as the letter without the quence, the far greater certainty and
spirit. In this life, surely, we must be stability of judicial administration there.
content Wilive in the body and to go by Written constitutions exist only in the
the letter, remembering always that the letter, and if that is disregarded or persoul and the spirit have no modes of verted, the .thing for which our fathers
action or expression except through the expended so much is gone with it. There
body and the letter. Every careful stu- is a spirit, but it dwells only in the letter.
dent of the common law, as administered
1. F.R.
in England and America, has had fre-
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A pardon is an act of mere grace, and is not founded on any preliminary steps
that furnish legal merits or a legal title.
The intention of the Executive to grant a pardon can have no legal force until carried into completed act. The completed act is the charter of pardon delivered.
By usage the delivery of a pardon to the warden of a prison is prinz faecie equivalent to delivery, or is a constructive delivery to the prisoner, but it is open to
be proved no delivery by showing circumstances that are inconsistent with the
intention to deliver it.
A pardon procured by false and forged representations and papers is void.
Therefore, in a ease where on the faith of a forged letter from the War Department, asking for a pardon, and stating that the prisoner was wanted for secret
public service, a pardon was eciecuted by the Governor and put into the hands
of the United States Marshal, to be delivered to the prisoner on his performance of the service, and by the marshal delivered to the warden of the prison
in order to obtain the release of the prisoner, Hetd, that this was not a delivery
to the prisoner, notwithstanding the custom in Pennsylvania to deliver pardons
to the warden of the prison to keep as his voucher.
Even had this been a delivery, the fraud in obtaining the pardon would have
avoided it, although it was not shown that the prisoner had any hand in perpetrating the fraud.
Whether the statute 27 Edw. 3, c. 2, is in force in Pennsylvania, qtuaereP

Habeas Corpus. The relator James Buchanan Crosse was convicted of forgery at the June Term 186U of the Court of Quarter
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Sessions of the county of Philadelphia, and sentenced to an
imprisonment of five years in solitary confinement-at labor in the
State Penitentiary.
On the 12th December 1862, he presented a petition to the
Bon. George W. WOODWARD, one of the justices of the Supreme
Court, at chambers, for a writ of habeas corpus, which was allowed
and made returnable ,before the Court in bane. The petition set
forth the conviction as-above recited.and the commitment thereon,
and also that on June 3d, 1862, his Excellency Andrew G. Curtin,
Governor of the Commonwealth, had granted to the petitioner,
under the great seal of the State, a full, free, and unconditional
pardon for the said offence, and that the same was shown and
delivered to the respondent the warden of the .said penitentiary;
further, that by reason of the said pardon 'the petitioner was
released from confinement in the said penitentiary by the said
Halloway, but was immediately thereafter taken by force and
compulsion to the city of Washington, and that on June 5th, 1862,
he .was brought back to the city of Philadelphia, and by-force and
compulsion was redelivered into the custody of the said Halloway,
by whom he was and still is illegally detained, &c.
On January 10th 1863, before the Court in bane, the respondent
made return setting forth the commitment as above recited, and
proceeding as follows:
c Respondent further says that true it is, that the Governor of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on the 3d day of June, A. D.
1862, made out a pardon for the said J. Buchanan Crosse, which
pardon was never delivered to said Crosse, but whs placed in the
hands of respondent on the 4th day of June, A. D. 1862, by
William Millward, Esq., United States Marshal for .the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. Respondent thereupon allowed said
Crosse to be taken away by and in the custody of said William
Millward, Esq.
",That said Millward, on the 5th day of June, A. D. 1862, returned
the said Crosse to the custody of the respondent.
" That said Crosse remained in the custody of Marshal Millward
until returned to the custody of respondent."
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The return further set forth that the said pardon had been
procured by certain forged letters from the Assistant Secretary of
War, copies of which were annexed, that the said pardon was
therefore void, and that the said Crosse was detained upon the
original commitment.
Immediately upon the reading of this return, Edward H. Wei7,
Esq., on behalf of the relator, filed a traverse to that part of it
which asserted that the pardon had not been delivered, and .on the
issue thus formed several witnesses were examined at the bar of
the Court.
Eli Slifer, Esq., Secretary of the Commonwealth, was first called,
and testified that some time early in June the Governor received
a letter purporting to be from the Assistant Secretary of War,
asking for the pardon of Crosse.
The next day United States Marshal Millward called and presented a recommendation for the pardon, signed by Collector
Thomas and United States District Attorney Coffey, and stating
that he was needed by the Government for some special service.
On this letter the pardon was granted. The great seal of the
State was attached. It was distinctly understood between the
Marshal and the Secretary, however, that the pardon was not to
be handed to Crosse until he had performed the service required
of him by the Government.
The pardon was never enrolled, was never treated as a completed
instrument. It was granted entirely on the letter to Governor
Curtin from the Secretary of War. It is usual to insert in pardons
the causes or suggestions for which they are granted, but it was
omitted in this case, because the letter from the Assistant Secretary of War desired that no publicity should be given to them.
The Secretary was first informed of the forgery the day after
the pardon was issued, by a despatch from Marshal MilIward,
saying that it was based on forged papers. The Secretary immediately telegraphed to the .Marshal to return the prisoner to the
penitentiary and return the pardon to him (the Secretary). It
was distinctly understood that Crosse was not to know of the pardon,
and it was not to be delivered to him until he had completed the
service required of him by the Government.
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Mi. Weil next offered in evidence a certified copy of the warden's
Journal of the Penitentiary, in the warden's handwriting.
The object of the offer was to show that the pardon had been
regularly entered on the journal, and that the prisoner had consequently been discharged from custody.
The offer was objected to by Mr. Mann and Mr. Meredith, on
the ground that a memorandum, made by the warden, was not
evidence in the case.
Chief Justice LOWRIE, after some little argument of counsel,
said that the paper could be used when Mr. Halloway came in.
William Millward, Esq., United States Marshal, was called and
testified that in June 1862, he received a letter as follows, purporting to come from the Assistant Secretary of War
"War Department, Washington City, June 1, 1862.
"William Millward, Esq., United States Marshal, Philadelphia, Pa.:
-Sir-The Secretary of War directs me to advise you of the' receipt of a dispatch
from the headqdarters of the army to this department, with an urgent request that
an immediate effort be made to send to that point the somewhat notorious forger,
J. Buchanan Crosse, now an inmate of your State Prison, and to instruct you to
proceed to Harrisburg, for the purposu of making a personal application to the
Executive for his release, and to bring him to this city with, the least possible
delay.
"You will please communicate the contents of this note to United States*District
Attorney Coffey, Collector Thomas, and Postmaster Walborn, and'request them to
append their names with your own to the petition enclosed, which, with a copy of
record of sentence, it is presumed will be sufficient, as this department has addressed a note to Governor Curtin, requesting his favorable consideration of the
same.
"Crosse is to be sent over the lines for a specific purpdse with'a telegraph
operator now in waiting at headquarters; and as the service will be attended with
much personal peril, the Secretary of War is desirous that no publicity be given
to the fact that the application for his release emanated from this Department, the
knowledge of which, in case of accident, would be fatal to him, and defeat the
purposes of Iiis mission. You will therefore observe at a glance the propriety of
avoiding any explanations whatever to the local authorities and prison officials, or
even to Crosse himself, until he reaches this point.
"Your prompt attention will be duly recognised by this Department.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
P. H. WATsON, Assistant Secretary of War."

That this letter was franked as he supposed by the Assistant
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Secretary of War; that the next morning he went to Harri~burg,
following the directions of the letter in every particular ; that he
there found that the Governor had received a similar letter from
the War Department, and that he then obtained the pardon from
the Secretary of State, who gave it to him on the express understanding that Crosse was not to know anything of it, and it was
not to be delivered to him until the service required of him had
been performed.
That he then returned to this city, and going to the Penitentiary,
presented the pardon to the warden, who permitted him to take
Crosse away. On going to Crosse's cell, witness asked him if he
would accompany him to Washington, saying that it might result
to his benefit. Crosse said, -Yes, if it is not for another trial." The
witness of course told him it was not for that purpose, and Crosse
said, "Yes, I will go; I am pardoned." This the witness denied.
The pardon was handed to the warden, with the express understanding that it was not to be known to Crosse, and no one in the
prison was to be informed of his removal.
Crosse was taken to Washington by witness and Deputy Marshal
Jenkins, and conveyed immediately to Secretary Stanton's office.
That explanation then ensued, and the Assistant Secretary was
sent for, and the letter purporting to come from him to the Marshal was shown him. He thought it was in his handwriting, but
had no recollection of writing such a letter. The franked envelope
in which it was contained was then shown, and the forgery was
detected by the frank being on a different side of the envelope
from that on which it was customary to write it. It was franked
as was the custom under Secretary Cameron.
That witness then had Crosse locked up for the night, and the
next day brought him back to Philadelphia and redelivered him to
the warden of the prison, as before stated.
Mr. Weil then proved the extract from the Warden's Journal,
and read a section of an Act" of Assembly requiring it to be kept.
The paper is as follows :" 1862.-June. Delivered into the custody of United States
Marshal Millward, under authority of a pardon from his Excellency
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A. G. Curtin, Governor of the State, prisoner No. 4304, J. Buchanan Crosse (white), who has been here one year and nearly
ten months.
" June 5. Prisoner No. 4304, J. Buchanan Crosse, was returned
to custody by Marshal Millward about 6 o'clock this evening, by
an order from Hon. Eli Slifer, Secretary of the Commonwealth,
recalling the pardon, and directing him to be again returned to the
Penitentiary, it appearing that the pardon had been obtained upon
The prisoner had never been out of
forged representations.
custody, nor had any official notice of his pardon."
Mr. Halloway was then examined, and testified to the calling
of Marshal Millward at the Penitentiary for Crosse, and the
details of that interview, substantially the same as testified to by
the Marshal. In addition, however, he stated that it was his custom, upon the discharge of a prisoner under a pardon, to exhibit
it to him, and almost invariably to read it to the prisoner, to show
upon what grounds his discharge was made; but, in reply to a
qudstion from Judge WOODWARD, he added that he would? not have
discharged him on a verbal statement of the marshal, and that he
only discharged him on the exhibition of the pardon, and on no
other ground. In reply to a question from Judge LowRIE, the
witness stated that he usually went to the prisoner and stated to
him the fact of his pardon, had him dressed and brought to the
office, where the pardon was exhibited and read. No Other evidence than the pardon is ever required. The pardon is usually
retained.
.. H. Weil, for the relator.-Where the king grants more
or other things than he intends, but is not deceived by any matter
suggested by the grantee, but is only mistaken in his own surmises,
such grant is good: Viner's Abr. 17, 100; 1 Strobha rt 162; 2
Wharton 453 ; 3 Johns. Cas. 333 ; 6 Watts 338.; 8 How. Pract.
Rep. (N. Y.) 316; 16 Peters 119; Shepherd's Touchstone 58; 5
Barn. & Cress: 692; 11 East 623; 5 Co. 49; 4 Blackst. Com.
402; 5 English 224; 18 How. 307; 1 Cranch 137; 9 Casey 283;
Hawk. P. C. 532, 538; Foster's Crown Law 284; 1 Chitty Cr.
Law 765; Cowp. 334; 1 Leach 118; ANl's Case (Pa.), not reported.

COMM ONWEALTH vs. HALLOWAY.

Hon. T. ff. Meredith, Attorney-General, with whom was WilHam B. Mann, District Attorney, for the respondent.-By the
common law, every charter or patent issued on false suggestion
was voidable by the Crown, and could be repealed on scire facias.
This applied to charters of pardon: Howard's Case, T. Raym. 13.
The law presumes that the charter was granted by reason of the
suggestions made by those who applied for it, and that these suggestions directly or indirectly came from the grantee, and these
are prcesumptiones juris et de jure, and cannot be contradicted. In
other words, a grant obtained by false suggestions from the public
authority, may for that reason be avoided, whether the false suggestions were or were not in fact made by the party benefited by
the grant.
Thus the law would stand on a scire facias. But that being
found an insufficient remedy, as the criminal would have an opportunity to escape before a trial could be had, the statute of 27 Ed.
3, c. 2, was passed, not to alter the law, but to give a necessary
jurisdiction in a speedier form.
That statute contains but two new provisions. The first is
directory, viz., that hence~sth the charter of pardon shall set
forth the suggestion, where it shall be granted at "any man's
suggestion." The second provision is, that if the justices before
whom such charter is alleged, shall find the suggestions to be untrue, they shall disallow the charter.
This Act, like the common law, does not require that the making
of the false suggestion shall be traced to the party ; it expressly
speaks of " any man's" suggestion. Nor does it make it the duty
of the justices to inquire into the truth of only the suggestions
recited in the pardon, for it commands such inquiry to be made
cc as well of charters granted before this time, as of charters which
shall be granted in time to come." Before the passage of the Act,
there had been no direction that the suggestions should be recited
in the charter. As this statute did not alter the law, but merely
gave a more effectual form of proceedings necessary to prevent
great public evils, and as it is entirely suitable for us, in every
respect, there can be no doubt but it is in force. The cases cited
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an the argument show that statutes have been so held to be which
were never actually enforced (no occasion having arisen) till a very
recent period. In fact, the Act of 1722 gave to the Supreme
Court all the powers and jurisdiction of the King's Bench and
Common Pleas, and this was one of them. The statute in question created no new law on the subject, but merely gave jurisdiction in a new form. This statute may therefore be considered as
expressly adopted by our Act of 1722.1
Weil, in reply.-The Statute Ed. 8 is not reported as in force
in Pennsylvania. If it ever was in force, it is repealed by the
Constitution, which does not require the Governor to give his
reasons for a pardon. Parol evidence cannot be given to vary or
control the pardon. The inducement alleged in the pardon is the
petition from the Marshal and others. There is nothing about the
letters. The false suggestions must appear on the face of the
pardon, and they must be shown to proceed from the grantee.
The opinion of the Court iwas delivered by
LOWRIE, C. J.-There are charters or patents for new inventions, for lands, for grants of corporate privileges, and as commissioners of public affairs, ag well as those of pardons; and
though all these have a strong likeness as to their form and to the
source whence they immediately proceed, yet they have .also some
marked points of unlikeness, that warn us to be cautious about
confounding the rules that belong to any one kind with those of
another. We notice here only the distinction that is important for
this case. With us, those that relate to new inventions, to lands,
to corporate privileges, and to offices, are usually only the last
step in the process by which certain rights become completely
vested; and when all the preliminary steps are regular and complete, this last step becomes a mere ministerial duty definitely
prescribed by law, and the claimant has a right to demand that it
shall be taken because he has performed all the conditions upon
We regret that no memorandum of cases cited by the Attorney-General could
be found in the office of the Court. There were no paper-books printed in. the
case.-EDs. A. L. R.
VOL. XI.-31
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which the law has made his title to it to depend. Then the appropriate charter becomes a vested right and the withholding of it a
civil injury, which may usually be redressed in some form of law;
and in some cases the matter may be treated as if the charter had
been actually delivered, though the fact be otherwise. These
instances bear a strong analogy to sales of land where all the
terms have been performed by the purchaser, and the conveyance
alone is wanting, or where a deed has been delivered in escrow,
and all the conditions of final delivery have been performed. The
equity of the law often dispenses with such final acts of investiture
of title as are, in their nature, only formal.
But charters of pardon are entirely different from these, in the
conditions on which they depend; for (not to speak of those which
are issued in pursuance of promises, by proclamation or otherwise,
of executive clemency) they are forwarded on mere grace, and not
at all on any preliminary steps that furnish legal merits or a legal
title to them. The intention of the executive to grant a pardon
can have no legal force until carried into completed act. And his
instructions to his proper officers, and their work in pursuance of
his instructions, are only the means by which he embodies his intentions into the completed act, and have no force out of the executive sphere until thus completed; though the Courts may, when
the intention is satisfactorily shown, suspend further proceedings
in expectation of the actual pardon, as has been sometimes done
in England. The completed act is the charter of pardon and
delivered. This is the one and only step that gives title to a pardon. Until delivery, all that may have been done is mere matter
of intended favor, and may be cancelled to accord with a change
of intention.
Was this pardon delivered ? In the strictest sense, no; for the
grantee of it never saw it or had it in his possession. But in a:
less strict sense, yes ; for it was delivered to the warden of the'
prison, and this has been with us usually treated as a delivery, the
charter of pardon having come, by a somewhat loose practice, to
be considered as the warden or keeper of the prison's voucher for
the discharge of the prisoner, rather than what it truly is, the
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prisoner's title to the pardon of his offence and to his discharge
from all the consequences of his conviction.
We say this practice is somewhat loose, because it takes away
from the grantee his title to his pardon, and throws upon the warden the responsibility of judging of its sufficiency. We do not
condemn the practice, because ordinarily it works very well, and
because the strict ancient practice that required the prisoner to
sue out a habeas corpus from the Court of King's Bench (Supreme
Court here), in order that he might appear'and plead his pardon,
and have it allowed there, would be very inconvenient with us. If
this strict practice were pursued, the prisoner could not get his
discharge without the judgment of the Court on the sufficiency of
his pardon, and it seems very proper that he should gain no advantage by this loose practice, beyond exemption from the inconvenience of the stricter practice.
But we have not fully answered the question,,was his pardon
delivered ? We think that by usage its delivery to the warden is
primdfacie equivalent to delivery, or is a constructive delivery to
the prisoner; but it is open to be proved no delivery by showing
circumstances that are inconsistent with the intention to deliver it.
The circumstances shown here are, that the Governor issued the
pardon as a means of putting the prisoner into the hands of the
United States Marshal, and through him into the hands of the
War Department at Washington, for the performance .of some
service to that department; that it was delivered to the Marshal
to be used for that purpose, and not to be used as a pardon unless
the prisoner would consent to go for that purpose, and was not
enrolled; that the prisoner was not informed of his pardon, but
consented to go to Washington, and was taken there, by the Marshal, who there learned that the Governor and he had been imposed
upon by forged letters as from the War Department, and no service was wanted from him, and the prisoner was thereupon brought
back by the Marshal on the next day without having been out of
his custody, and immediately returned to his cell in the Penitentiary;
and the entry on the -warden's books is in accordance with this,
that he was delivered into the custody of the Marshal under the
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authority of the pardon, and on the next day returned. By order
of the Secretary of the Commonwealth the pardon was sent back
to him.
We have already found a constructive delivery, independent of
circumstances; do the circumstances just related change the result
or forbid such a finding? We think they do. The intention of
the Governor was to accommodate the Wdr Department, by allowing it to obtain the services of the prisoner, and the intention to
pardon was only an incident of this, and dependent upon it.
There was no intention to pardon except for the purpose of meeting a supposed request of the War Department for the services of
the prisoner, and when this turns out to be entirely without foundation, there can be no reason for attributing any efficiency to the
subordinate and dependent intention. Judicial constructions, like
judicial fictions, are designed to further and not to frustrate
equity and justice, and can never prevail against manifest right
and justice, and the prisoner has no sort of merits in law or equity
on which to base a claim that this pardon was constructively delivered or constructively vests in him any right. A delivery of
goods to a carrier is usually a constructive delivery to the consignee,
but not so if it be induced by mistake or fraud; at least not irrevocably so.
True, the prisoner was taken out of the Penitentiary by means
of the pardon; but he was not discharged under it, else he would
have gone free and not have been brought back. He was not
intended to be discharged, except to enter upon the expected service, and he has no equity to claim that the mistaken delivery to
the marshal shall stand for a discharge on a complete and valid
pardon. The most that could be made of it would be that this
was the application of the form of a pardon to an unauthorized
purpose, and that his delivery to the Marshal was a voluntary or
an involuntary escape, neither of which is equivalent to a- pardon.
We think, also, that this pardon is void because of the false and
forged representations and papers that were used in procuring it
from the Governor. We do not feel entirely prepared to assent to
that part of the argument of the Attorney-General which would
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base this conclusion on the Statute 27 Ed. 3, c. 2, 1 Ruff 273,
because we are not entirely satisfied that that statute- has been
received as part of our law. We prefer leaving that question open
for future consideration. But we think the principles of the common law demand this conclusion, and they have a rather wider
extent than the provisions of this statute.
By the statute a pardon is to be disallowed by the Judges of
their own motion, if any of the suggestions contained in it appear
to be false; but by the common law all charters and patents may
be avoided if based on any false suggestion, whether the suggestions be contained in them or not. This question, however, can
be raised only at the instance of the Attorney-General, as the law
officer of the Executive, for it would be quite indecent that any
other person should raise it, unless under some- carefully prepared
statutory regulation. Such a question may be raised by a scire
facias to repeal the charter; but it may also be 'raised on habeas
corpus issued.to allow the prisoner to plead his pardon; for the
Commonwealth is a party to that proceeding, and the AttorneyGeneral may appear and answer the plea, by showing the false
sitggestions on which the pardon was obtained.
Here the falsity of the suggestion is very plain. True, there
is no falsity in the suggestion specified in the pardon. But this is
fully accounted for. The suggestion that is recited contains only
the general reason of public expediency, because the special
grounds of that expediency were to be kept secret. The forged
letters to the Governor and Marshal suggested that the prisoner
was needed for some secret, public service, and that, as this could
not be recited in the pardon, an application should be made that

should specify only general considerations, so that the pardon
might be founded on that without naming the letters.
We do nQt feel the force of the objection that the prisoner does
not appear to have had any hand in the forging of the letters. He
can claim nothing as a favor that is founded on the fraud of his
friends, so as to prevent the frustration of the fraud. Any person may reclaim the rights out of which he has been cheated, until
they come into the hands of a third person, who is a bond fide
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purchaser for value, without notice of the fraud. And so may the
Commonwealth. The prisoner has no merit of his own that is
sufficient to override the fraud of his friends in thik matter. When
he shows that he has he will, no doubt, get a iaew and honest pardon. He has no better title to this pardon than a consignee of
goods would have after the goods had been stopped in transitu, or,
the discovery that the sale and delivery had been procured by
letters forged by the friends of the consignee.
The prisoner is remanded.
1. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of
which delivery is essential, and delivery
is not complete without acceptance. If
rejected by the person to whom it is
tendered there is no power in a court to
force it on him, and this rule must be
the same in capital cases as in misdemeanors: United States vs. Wilson, 7
Pet. S. C. 150.
It appears, however, that strict form
in the charter itself will not be insisted
upon. Thus an instrument in writing,
issued by the President under the seal
of the United States, directing a person
sentenced for robbing the mail to be
forthwith released from prison, imprisonment being the only punishment inflicted by his sentence, was held to be a
pardon: Jones vs. Harris, I Strobh. 160.
2. The Constitution of the United
States, art. 2, sect. 2, gives the power
to pardon "offences against the United
States, except in cases of impeachment,"
to the President, in analogy to the common law, which vested that power in the
King as the supreme executive head of
the government. We adopt the English
principles in regard to pardons. MARSHALL, C. J., in United States vs. Wilson,
ut map. The language of the Constitution in reference to pardons must be
construed by the meaning in England
and in the states at the time of the adoption of the Constitution: W,%. :, J., in
Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307. Most of

the states have inserted similar provisions in their constitutions, though the
power of the Governor is in many of
them restrained by various conditions
relating either to the offences themselves
or the manner in which pardon for them
may be granted. Thus in many states
treason (and in some murder) is excepted, as well as cases of impeachment,
the power to pardon for these offences
being generally lodged with the legislature; in some states the Governor is
obliged to set forth his reasons in writing, and to make a report of all pardons to the legislature. Subject to these
limitations, the power to pardon extends
to all cases of offences against the public or the state. As a general principle,
however, this does not include cases
where private justice is principally concerned in the prosecution of offenders.
Therefore it is said that a common nuisance cannot be pardoned while unredressed, or so as to prevent, an abatement of it, because it is more in the
nature of a private injury to individuals, than a public wrong: 2 Hawk. P.
Nor call a pardon reC., cl. 37, s. 83.
mit the portion of a penalty or costs
that go to a third person: United States
vs. Lancaster, 4 Wash. C. C. 64; State
vs. Williams. I N. & M. 26; Ex parte
McDonald, 2 Whart. 440: Rucker vs.
Bosworlh. 7 J"..J. Marsh. 1 '1 ; Rowe rs.
The State, 2 Day 565. Upon this prin-
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mple also, it was much questioned
whether the pardoning power extended
to cases of contempt. Mr. Berrien, Attorney-General, thought it would not
(March 17th 1830): 2 Opin. A. G. 329;
but it is now well settled that it does.
H. D. Gilpin, Attorney-General (Februnry 27th 1841), 3 Opin. A. G. 622; J.
Nelson, Attorney-General (April 15th
1844), 4"Opin. A. G. 317; Ex parte
Hickey, 4 Sm. & Marsh. 751.
3. There has been much discussion as
to the power of granting conditional pardons. In some states special provision
is made in the constitution or the statutes, but the general doctrine, upon
the principle that the greater power includes the lesser, is that the power to pardon absolutely includes the power to
pardon conditionally. A pardon, it is
said, is an exercise of sovereign clemency towards the guilty, not of justice
to the innocent. Therefor6, a full restitutfion or compensation for suffering is
not necessarily contemplated: Cook vs.
Middlesex, 2 Dutch. 326. The best discussion of conditional pardons will be
found in Flavell's Case, 8 W. & S. 197,
where SERGEANT, J., says, "The Governor may annex to a pardon any condition, whether precedent or subsequent,
not forbidden by law, and it lies on the
grantee to perform it. If he does not,
in case of a condition precedent the pardon does not take effect; in case of a
condition subsequent the pardon beconies null; and if the dondition is not
performed, the original sentence remains
in full vigor and may be carried into
effect." This is cited and approved by
the Supreme Court of the United States,
zu Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307, where
it is expressly decided that the President
may grant a conditional pardon to a person under sentence of death, offering to
commute the sentence to imprisonment
for life. And it cannot. be considered

that such pardon was accepted by the
prisoner under duress. Id., MACLEAN,
J., dissenting.
In some cases, however, the conditions
have been held void. Thus a condition
to submit to bodily labor for three years;
was held illegal and the pardon absolute: Commonwealth vs. Fowler, 4 Call.
35. And a clause in the pardon declaring that it is not intended to relieve
from the legal disabilities arising from
conviction and sentence, was held repugnant, and not to prevent the person from
being a competent witness: People vs.
Pease, 3 Johns. Cas. 333. But in Perkins vs. Stevens, 24 Pick. 277, it is said
the case of People vs. Pease stands alone
on the point of repugnancy.
So strictly was a pardon construed,
that where the condition was that the
prisoner "should leave the state of Arkansas without delay," and it was proved
that he had left but returned within five
months, it was held that the condition
had been performed and the pardon was
absolute: Ex parte Hunt, 5 Eng. 284.
The general principle would appear
to be that a pardon is the remission or
mitigation of a penalty, and includes
under the latter title, te substitution
of any punishment which the court
might have inflicted for a lesser degree
of the same offence. Some cases, however, have gone much beyond this. Thus
although banishment was not recognised
by any law as a punislment, yet a condition that the criminal should leave the
United States and not return was held
legal: People vs. Potter, 1 Parker C. R.
47. And it is said "there can he no
other limitation to the power than that
the condition shall be possible, moral,
and legal." State vs. Smith, 1 Bailey S.
C. 281: State vs. Addington, 2 Id. 516.
4. By the common law "wherever it
may reasonably be presumed the King
is deceived, the pardon is void." 4

COMMONWEALTH vs. HALLOWAY.
Blackst. 400; 2 Hawk. P. C. b. 2, c. 37,
s. 8, et seg. This has been held with
great strictness. Thus the defendant
was sentenced and afterwards a writ of
error was allowed, which annulled 'he
judgment: pending this a pardon was
granted, and afterwards the judgment
was affirmed in the superior court, held
that the Governor being misinformed,
there being no sentence in force at the
time, the pardon was void and the court
must sentence on the new judgment:
State vs. McIntire, I Jones (Law) N. C.
1. In this case it was said that it appeared from the record and the pardon
itself that the Governor was misinformed; and it has been contended that this
is the proper general principle, that errors to avoid the pardon nmust appear on
the face of it. In the case before us,
however, this point is expressly decided
to the contrary, upon the.principles of
the common law.
5. In regard to the manner in which
pardons may be taken advantage of, it
is said that a pardon by act of parliament is more beneficial than by the
King's charter, for the court must take
judicial notice of it: 4 Blackst. Com.
401. But this applies only to a general
pardon, for a special pardon by act of
parliament would still be only a private
act, which must be pleaded. And it is
presumed that the same law would obtain here in those cases where pardons are granted by the legislature,
though the point does not appear to
have arisen. In regard to other pardons, it is said that they should be
brought "judicially before the court by
plea, motion, or otherwise." U. S. vs.
Wilson, 7 Pet. S. C. 150. In Pennsylvania a different practice has obtained,
-is appears by the principal case. Where
a pardon, however, is offered in evidence,
the charter itself or a certified copy must

be produced, or its loss accounted for :
Spalding vs. Saxton, 6 Watts 338 ; Cox
vs. Cox, 2 Casey 375.
6. The effect of a pardon is to acquit
the offender of the penalties annexed to
his conviction, and to give him a new
credit and capacity. It cannot, however, divest any person of any right or
interest which the law had permitted to
be acquired and vested in consequence
of the judgment. Therefore, a pardon
of one sentenced to imprisonment for
life does not annul the second marriage
of his wife nor the sale of his property
by the persons appointed to administer
his estate, nor divest his heirs of their
interest in his estate: Denning's Case,
10 Johns. 232. But it does restore him
to his relation of father, and there cannot be any intervening right to defeat it.
Id. A pardon restores competency as a
wi!ness, but the conviction may be used
to affect his credibility: Baum vs. Clause,
5 Hill 196. But whether a pardon of
the "remainder" or "residue" of a
sentence will restore competency, is not
settled. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holding that it will: Hoifman
vs. Coster, 2 Whart. 4.53; and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that it
will not: Perkins vs. Stevens, 24 Pick.
277. A pardon, however, is only for the
offence named. Thus a pardon of an
assault, which by subsequent death of
the person assaulted becomes murder,
will not be a pardon of the latter crime:
Ss.xw, C. J., in Commonwealth vs. Itoby,
12 Pick. 508; Hawkins vs. The State, 1
Porter (Ala.) 475.
A discharge from prison under a pardon is a discharge "in due.course of
law," rendering the convict liable to an
additional sentence under the Massachusetts statute of 1832, c. 73, if recommitted: Evans rs. Commonwealth, 3
Met. 453.
J, T. M.
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In the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
ANDREW M'MICKEN,

TRUSTEE,

ETC., VS.

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

OF THE M'MICK;N UNIVERSITY.'
The term "household furniture," though not susceptible of strict definition, has
acquired a definite meaning, by which it is understood to include everything
which may contribute to the use or convenience of the householder, or the ornament of the house, such as plate, linen, china, pictures, &c.
Where a testator by his will bequeathed to A. "all his library and household furniture of every description, and any other personal property not thereinafter specifically devised," and by a subsequent clause devised to B. "all his real estate
and personal property, which he may acquire after the date of his will," and
again to B. "all the rest and residue of his real and personal estate, not thereinbefore devised," .Held, that a portrait of testator, painted after the making of
the will, and at the time of his death still in possession of the artist in another
city, passed to A. under the devise of "household furniture."
By the law of Ohio "family pictures" are exempt from execution, but, per STORER,
J., this exemption would not extend to the private gallery bf a connoisseur nor
to costly pictures the subjects of which are not connected with the family in
whose possession they are found.

W. B. Caldwell and Xf. Hf. Tilden, for plaintiff.
T. C. Ware, fbr defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STORER, J.-This action is brought to test the ownership of a
portrait of Charles McMicken, deceased, -the uncle of the plaintiff,
and the founder of the McMicken University.
The plaintiff claims the property as legatee of Chirles McMicken,
whose will was made in September, 1855. The testator died in
1857, and his will was admitted to probate in April in the same
year.
Mr. MeMicken was a resident of Cincinnati, but his will was
executed in Philadelphia; between the making of which and his
death, he had sat for his portrait to an artist of the latter city, who
had finished it, though it was still in his possession at McMicken's
death. It was sent afterwards to Cincinnati, and all the parties
I

We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of M. H. Tilden, Esq.
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concerned hiive submitted the case to us, to determine the ownership of the property.
The testator's family mansion, where he had long resided with
one or both of the claimants, was in Cincinnati, and there was all
his furniture and household ornaments, with the exception of his
portrait.
By the 8th clause of the 4th section of his will, he gave to the
plaintiff " all his library and household furniture of every description, and any other personal property not thereinafter specifically
devised, to be equally divided with his niece, Lizzie 'McMicken."
Other bequests are made to the same parties, as well as to other
relatives and friends; but the great mass of his estate is given to
the city of Cincinnati, "for the purpose of building, establishing,
and maintaining two colleges for white boys and girls." This
devise is in section 31, and the different classes of property given
are particularly stated. For this purpose, by the 5th clause, "all
his real estate and personal property which he may acquire after
the date of his will," and, by the 9th clause, "all the rest and residue
of his real and personal estate, not thereinbefore devised," is given
to the city. These several clauses are those under which the parties
severally claim.
The plaintiff regards the bequest of "the household furniture
of every decription" as broad enough to include the testator's portrait. The defendants, who represent the city, place their right
upon the 5th and 9th clauses of the 31st section, already referred to.
The words "household furniture," or, as some of the older
writers use the term, "household stuff," have now, we suppose, a
definite meaning, and are understood by the profession to include
a class of personal chattels very readily distinguished from the more
general description, by which movable property may pass to a
devisee or a vendee.
One of the earliest cases in the books where the question is discussed is that of Kelly vs. -Powlet,Ambler 605. The point there
made to the Master of the Rolls, Sir TnoIIAs CLARK, was this :
did plate pass to the legatee of the "household furniture?" In
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4onsidering the question, he says, "the word household furniture
has as general a meaning as possible. It is incapable of a definition. It comprises everything that contributes to the use or convenience of the householder or the ornament of the house." The
term was held to be large enough to include plate, whether in use
or not, provided it was in the possession of the devisor, and not
intended for any other purpose than that of household use; the
quantity and value to be measured by the condition and rank of the
family. It was admitted by the plaintiff in this case, who is reported to have been present in Court, that "pictures, whether hung
up or in cases, would pass by the devise," as well as plate. This
case is also reported in Dickens 359.
Bef re this decision, it was held, in Bridgman vs. Darr, 3 Atk.
202, that a library of books did not pass by the words household
furniture, giving, as a reason, that "they were for the entertainment
of the mind, and not, furniture for use or ornaipent." The rule
has also been, in some one of its phases, discussed in Franklin vs.
.arl of Burlington, Prec. in Oh. 251, Nichols vs. Osborne, 2 Peere
Williams 400, Le _Tarrant vs. Spencer, 1 Vesey Sr., 97, and Gagyre
vs. aayre, 2 Vernon 538. In -Prattvs. Jackson, 2 Peere Williams
302, the construction given by the Lord Chancellor was deemed
too liberal, and on appeal to the House of Lords his decision was
reversed: 3 Bro. Pa. Cas. 194.
The doctrine to be deduced from all these cases is summed up b~r
Mr. Roper thus: "By the term household furniture, everything is
included which may contribute to the use or convenience of the
householder or the ornament of the house, as plate, linen, china,
both useful and ornamental, and pictures:" Law of Legacies 141.
The English Courts have been consistent in their.construction of
the words we have alluded to. We discover no exception to the
principle in any of the cases, from the report in Ambler to th(
present time. On the contrary, we find the law stated without an3
reservation in Cole vs. Fitzgerald, 1 Sim. & Stu. 189, which wa:
affirmed in 3 Russell 320. The question was again discussed it
(remorin vs. Antrobus, 5 Russell 320, where Lord LYNHURS
expressly held these words would pass to the devisee " ornamenta'
pictures."
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Mr. Williams, in his elaborate work on Executors, Vol. 2, 1021,
accepts the construction without any dissent on his part; and Jarman, in Vol. 1, 699, admits the doctrine in his text without reservation, though in a note he quotes from the report in Ambler, that
"pictures hung up will pass ;" while in the case to which he refers,
reported both in Ambler and Dickens, it is expressly stated that
the admission included " pictures not only hanging up, but those
found in cases."
The meaning thus given to these devisory words is quoted with
approbation by Chancellor KENT, in Bann et al. vs. Winthrop, 1
Johns. Ch. Cas. 329, and by the Court of Appeals in Virginia, in
Garnagy vs. 1froodcock, 2 Munford 234.
In Ohio, we have no judicial construction of these words in any
reported case, but our Legislature, by several important statutory
provisions, has informed us what its understanding has been of this
class of personal property. By the section 43 "of the Act to provide for the settlement of the estates of decedents," 1 Swan 574,
the personal representative is, in all cases, expressly required to
leave with the widow, to be kept by her for life, and after her
decease to be the absolute property of her children, all "family
pictures." And by the 3d clause of the 1st section of an amendment to the law regulating judgments and executions, "family
pictures are exempted from levy and sale."
We ought not to extend the exemption in these clauses to the
private gallery of a connoisseur, nor yet to costly pictures, the
subjects of which are not connected with the family in whose possession they are found. As the family Bible is specially excepted
which preserves the names, the births, the marriages, 4nd the
burial of the parents and the children, so the portrait of a father
or a mother may well be preserved as a living memory to a son or
a daughter, alike consecrated by human sympathy, and vindicated
by the law.
By the terms of the bequest in the 8th clause of the 4th section
of the testator's will, the property described, which is defined to
be household furniture of every description, must -necessarily embrace all similar chattels owned by the deviser at the time of his
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death, unless there is a subsequent clause restricting the bequest,
or changing its natural meaning.
Such was the ruling of Lord CAMIDnm, in The Dean and Chapter
of Christ Church vs. Barrow, Ambler 641. "1 am clear," said
he, "that the pictures added to the testator's collection, after
making his will, passed by the devise to the plaintiffs, upon the
principle that personal estate is ever fluctuating; and so would it
be in case of a devise of all a man's personal estate generally."
See also Masters vs. Masters, 1 Peere Williams 424.
So in Swinburne on Wills 418: "It seems clear," says the
author, "by our law and the civil law, that a deVise of all a man's
personal estate passes all he may die possessed of, and not only that
he had at the time he made his will: if the contrary resolution
should prevail, it would put one under the difficulty of making a
new will every day, and create the greatest perplexity imaginable."
See also Gayre vs. Gayre, 2 Vernon 538; Wilde vs. Holzmeyer, 5
Vesey Jr. 811.
The spirit of the 55th section of our Wills Act, 2 Swan. & 0.
1627, although applicable to real estate strictly, would apply, if
there could be room for doubt. In England, the Act of 1 Vict. c.
26, which changes the ancient rule as to after-acquired estates,
expressly includes real and personal property by name.
If the devisory words we have thus examined will. embrace the
description of chattel in litigation, does the 5th clause of the
31st section of the testator's will limit the former bequest, explain
it, or in any way modify his then expressed intention? The words
relied on by the defendants' counsel are these: "iill my real estate
and personal property which I may acquire after the' date of this
my will," following the introductory language of the section, "1I
give, devise, and bequeath to the city of Cincinnati."
This clause, although broad enough to convey the whole afteracquired personalty, must be taken in connection with the previous
devise to the plaintiff and his sister Lizzie, and be construed with
all the circumstances attending the execution of the will, the nature
of the chattel bequeathed, as well as the general purpose the
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testator designed to accomplish, before we can clearly ascertain his
intention.
The words household furniture are not used in any part of the
will, except in the clause which gives all such property to the plaintiff and his sister. There is no restriction upon the terms, nor yet
any exception as to chattels of the same description suggested by
the testator. He commences the distribiution of his estate by
expressions having a known legal definition, and which unquestionably were understood by the counsel who drew the will, as well as
by the devisor himself: he makes an absolute gift to his nephew
and niece of all the chattels included in the class he described,
without restriction or limitation, and it may well be inferred he
could not have intended that the words personal property, subsequently used, should include any article of the class he had already
excepted, more especially when we find he annexes to the term
household furniture the words "and any other personal property
not hereinafter specifically devised," thereby distinguishing his
household furniture from 'every other denomination of his personalty. This is the settled rule of construction, where a prior
clause in a will is attempted to be controlled by a subsequent one,
whether in the same instrument or a codicil.
The principle is, "that technical words or words of known legal
import shall have their legal effect, unless from subsequent inconsistent words it is very clear that the testator meant otherwise :"
2 Williams on Executors 927.
The leading ease of Jesson et at. vs. Wright, decided by the
House of Lords, and reported in 2 Bligh 56, 57, in which all the
authorities were examined, establishes fully the doctrine. See also
the opinion of Baron ALDERSON, in Lees vs. Mossley, I Y. & Coll.
Exch. Eq. Cases 589, and IDENMAN, C. J., in Gallini vs. Gallini
5 B. & Adolph. 621. This doctrine is stated very clearly in Young
and Wife vs. Executors of Mcntyre, 3 Ohio 501. "The widow,"
says the Court, "claims upon .general terms, and seeks an interpretation contrary to the evident intention. The daughter claims upon
a bequest in express terms of the specific subject, and her claim
comports with the whole intention."
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See also 4 Ohio St. 351, TDompson's Administratorvs. Thompson
et al. Nor is there any objection to this construction, in the fact
that the portrait had not yet become a part of the household goods,
and was moreover in a distant city when he died. It is a iatter
of intention merely, to what purpose the testator designed to apply
it, and there is nothing to destroy the very natural implication,
that it was his purpose to place it in his family mansion, any more
than there would be if he had purchased in the same city, a service
of china, or of plate, or some valuable article of mahogany or
rosewood.
It might well be asked, if the object of the testator was not to
make the portrait a part of his household ornaments, for what
other purpose did .he sit to the artist ? "None is intimated, much
less proved.
We regard the relation the testator bore to his kinsmen of great
importance in ascertaining his purposes to the various devisees in
his will. He was an aged man and had never been married. The
plaintiff and his sister were inmates of their uncle's family; the
niece living with him, and doubtless, presiding over his household.
To both, he gives by the 9th clause- of the same section, under
which the plaintiff claims the property in controversy, the permission
jointly "to occupy his dwelling-house for the period of five years
free of rent," thereby clearly intimating, as we believe, not only
that the family mansion, at his decease, but the family furniture
already devised, should alike be enjoyed by the legatees.
There would seem to be a fitness in sustaining such bequest, as
the possession of the one very naturally attaches. to it, whatever
made convenient, or ornamented the other. The object was to
preserve both, that the family, having lost its head, might still be
remembered in this token of his regard for the surviving members.
A painstaking, laborious man, who had gained by industry- a
large fortun6; who had struggled in the battle of life and won
pecuniary independence; having no children, was about to distribute
his estate, before the law would make a division among his kinsmen.
With great particularity he gives to a long list of relations and
friends, some token, either in money, real estate, or personal prc,-
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perty, of his regard. Having thus performed what he deemed to
be his duty to others, he proposes to educate the poor children of
Cincinnati; where he had long lived and at last died.
To establish on a magnificent scale, an institute for the moral
and intellectual improvement of generations yet to come, he had
an ideal before him to which his mind seemed to cling with great
tenacity, and he developed it in his will, ivith as much clearness
of detail, as the outlines of such a vast plan could be understood
or foreshadowed, before its parts were finally adjusted, and its
workings practically understood.
With this double object in view, the remembrance of his relatives,
and the establishment of a noble charity for his race, we cannot
suppose he could intend the bequest to either object should be contradicted by general terms, or mere formal language.
His family furniture could not materially aid in the foundation
of a great public institution, either by the sale of the property, or
its introduction within its walls. It was fit only for the family
mansion, and could alone be properly valued by those who could
associate with it the name of their relative and friend, who in common with them participated in its daily use ;-more especially so,
when a family portrait becomes the evidence of former friendship,
or future remembrance.
We cannot presume it could have been the intention of the deceased to bequeath the mere work of the artist to an institution to
commemorate the name of its founder, when by an act of princely
liberality he had already erected a monument, upon which he might
well inscribe the language of the poet:
"Non omnis moriar,

Multaque pars mei vitabit Libitinam"

It will be more in harmony with the testator's spirit, and illustrate
more truly the modesty with which he endows a university,.by the
bequest to our city of nearly half a million of dollars, for our own
people to provide the portrait, or the statue, to commemorate a public
benefactor. He who left them a splendid inheritance has done
enough to perpetuate his name. When the edifice shall be erected,

